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Arguing that the courts should promote "sound governance,"
Professor Christopher Edley's Administrative Law takes the first few
steps on the road toward a much needed reformulation of the field.
Much of the book involves a critique of the traditional categories of
administrative law-what Edley calls the "trichotomy"-namely, the
concepts of adjudicatory fairness, science, and politics, and the corre-
sponding institutional analogues of court, agency, and legislature. This
triadic structure of administrative law, Edley argues, ultimately "gets in
the way of clear thinking and forthright explanation" (p. 11).
According to Edley, judicial review of administrative actions focuses
on a futile search for a formula to determine when deference is appropri-
ate (p. 96). Oddly, although Congress chooses to delegate broadly in the
first place "because everyone concedes Congress's institutional inability
to get involved in the details" (pp. 97-98), courts justify deference on the
ground that "Congress will fix things" (p. 97). Edley argues that in
many circumstances the doctrinal categories tend to merge, "making it
even more difficult to use them as the basis for scaling judicial deference"
(p. 101). Thus, he concludes that the judiciary's attempt to assign issues
to courts, agencies, or legislatures is an empty taxonomic exercise.
While it is easy enough to support a shift from unhelpful doctrinal
categories to a more principled approach, it is quite another thing to
articulate that approach persuasively. Anachronistic categories can be a
convenient way of disguising fundamental normative disputes. Edley
himself recognizes that "[s]uch terms as arbitrary, abuse of discretion,
and substantial evidence must be defined with reference to the decision
making paradigm under examination; the definitions cannot be determi-
native if the paradigm is itself poorly discerned and inadequately speci-
fied" (p. 114).
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Only in the last chapter does Edley believe that he has "earned the
right to speculate" (p. 213) and proposes sweeping changes in the institu-
tion of judicial review to promote "sound governance." He is, however,
rather vague about what sound governance entails, expressing hope that
"continuing dialogue among the branches" will lead to "the evolution of
norms" (p. 236), and echoing Judge Wright's belief that the "'ultimate
test of the Justices' work.., must be goodness'" (p. 235). Yet Edley's
formulation is not completely open-ended. He seems to be a policy ana-
lyst at heart, supporting training in economic analysis for judges (p. 239)2
and approving judicial remands to agencies to conduct cost-benefit analy-
ses (p. 232). He supports disclosure, wide participation, agency discre-
tion, and multiple decisionmaking fora (pp. 262-64).
I
THE TRICHOTOMY
Edley's trichotomy encompasses the familiar administrative law cat-
egories of adjudicatory fairness, science, and politics. It is a common-
place of administrative law that modem public agencies incorporate all
three decisionmaking paradigms. Yet, as Edley points out, the courts
view agencies as best suited to find facts because "such determinations
are the product either of scientific or expert inquiry and judgment or of
an assimilation of detailed and varied evidence or experience, for which
the agency is particularly well qualified by virtue of its bureaucratic
organization of resources" (pp. 31-32, 100). The judiciary attempts to
police the boundary between the agencies and the courts, and the bound-
ary between the agencies and the legislature, relying on the courts' and
legislature's assumed competence in law and politics, respectively. This
policing effort, Edley argues, is doomed to failure (pp. 80-83).
Previous efforts to provide prescriptive frameworks for administra-
tive law are, according to Edley, also inadequate. He groups these previ-
ous efforts into three categories: rule of law/legal process, politics and
interest accommodation, and expertise and ideal administration (pp. 133-
62). He also discusses a fourth perspective which relies on "pragmatism"
and eschews any attempt at conceptualization (pp. 162-68). All these
previous commentaries fail to address the flaws of the trichotomy. The
first does not adequately come to terms with either the role of politics or
expertise in agency decisionmaking (p. 143). The second distorts agency
activities, seeing them only through the "prism of politics" (p. 153). For
example, Edley argues that:
1. Quoting Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REv. 769, 797 (1971).
2. Edley notes, "I admit that it does little good to decry, as I do, the unwillingness of courts
to probe for shoddy policy science if the court cannot tell it when it sees it" (p. 57).
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a dispute about the importance of a risk posed to the Hudson River fish
by construction of a power facility[3] might be thought of as the subject
for a political contest between environmental, consumer, and industry
interests, as a scientific issue for careful study by biologists and cost-bene-
fit analysts, or as an issue for adjudicatory law-finding methods, inas-
much as the legislature or administrative precedents suggest what weight
should be accorded the various interests (p. 152) (footnote omitted).
Unsurprisingly, the third attempt to provide a prescriptive framework
overemphasizes the positive norm of expertise, a result which Edley finds
"unappealing" (p. 162). Finally, a "pragmatic" approach does little
more than replicate the confusions in the case law (p. 167).
One could argue that Edley has himself become the prisoner of the
very categories he seeks to reject. He remains influenced by the rhetoric
of the separation of powers and can only see government in terms of
triangles. This produces a blurred conflation of concepts that might bet-
ter be kept distinct.
Let us begin with the paradigm of politics. Several years ago I had
an article translated into French4 and was surprised to discover that the
French word for politics, politique, is also the French word for policy.
While this limitation in the French language may reflect something about
the nature of the French political system, using the same word for both
concepts seems to prejudge a difficult issue. Edley, however, engages in
the same conflation of terms (p. 53). In one sense this conflation is irrele-
vant since he concludes that drawing sharp lines between categories is
pointless (pp. 72-74, 184). Nevertheless, something important is over-
looked by lumping together interest-balancing choices, or even
majoritarian ones, with decisions made through policy analytic tech-
niques designed to maximize net benefits. Edley has put into one box
decisionmaking methods, such as cost-benefit analysis (which require a
commitment to a set of substantive values), with others whose justifica-
tion is procedural. Considerable analytic bite is lost by labeling as "polit-
ical" both an agency study of the costs and benefits of acid rain and an
agency decision to spread urban assistance funds over as many congres-
sional districts as possible in order to improve the chances of additional
funding.
This grouping also appears to condemn expert policy analysis as an
oxymoron, a conclusion which seems directly counter to Edley's belief
3. See Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 827 (2d Cir.
1974); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
4. Rose-Ackerman, 'Inalienabiliti et la thdorie des droits de proprifti 12 REVUE DE LA
RECHERCHE JURIDIQUE: DRorr PROSPECTIF 533 (1987). The article is a translation of Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
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that judges should do more to evaluate the "soundness" of agency action
(p. 221). Of course, I do not mean to deny that "political" factors, in the
narrow sense, can influence the conclusions of a cost-benefit analysis or a
risk assessment. Policy analysis is not an exact science, and judgments
about such factors as the rate of discount or the monetization of non-
traded costs and benefits can tilt the conclusions in favor of powerful
groups. But such a politically motivated choice would be a distortion of
the underlying principles of analysis, not something making it essentially
the same as logrolling. Furthermore, one would need a rather different
legislative structure than is presently available to argue that the Congress
should be a producer rather than a consumer of policy studies.
Turning next to the paradigm of science, Edley notes that in "funda-
mental and immutable respects, science and bureaucracy are incompati-
ble" (p. 56). Yet he includes both scientific expertise and public
administration in the same box, linking "the scientific method and mana-
gerial efficiency" (p. 14). Edley places in one category a paradigm justi-
fied in terms of one kind of substantive outcome-the discovery of
scientific truth-with another justified in terms of the effective accom-
plishment of set tasks on a large scale. These agency roles seem linked
only by the observation that courts and legislatures are incompetent in
both areas.
The final paradigm of adjudicatory fairness is also overinclusive. In
introducing the concept, Edley emphasizes both procedural issues (con-
sistency, reasoned elaboration, neutral decisionmakers, rights to hearings
and confrontation) and substantive ones (law-finding) (p. 14). The hope
of legal commentators is that the use of legalized procedures will produce
legally correct results, but as Edley recognizes (p. 25), this is a proposi-
tion to be demonstrated-not a conclusion to be assumed. If one accepts
that point, then one must ask whether adjudicative procedures are justi-
fied because people think them fair in and of themselves or because they
are actually effective in producing valued outcomes.' Once again, the
exposition of the trichotomy is confused by the blurring of substantive
and procedural values.
Finally, consider Edley's use of the institutional analogues in the
trichotomy: legislatures, agencies, and courts. His focus, in typical sepa-
ration of powers style, is entirely on government. Yet the interaction
between private organizations and the government is of central impor-
tance to understanding the development of the modem administrative
state. Agencies typically contract out for many of their scientific tasks
and use private organizations to administer programs and provide serv-
ices. Even the judiciary makes use of special masters who are lawyers
5. Suppose it could be shown that jury trials were more likely to convict innocent people than
bench trials. Would the supporters of the jury nevertheless continue to support jury trials?
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detailed from private practice to perform particular tasks. While
Congress has increased its levels of staff and improved the quality of in-
house expertise, it nevertheless continues to rely on outside interest
groups for much of its information. A broader attempt to break down
the traditional categories of administrative law would need to recognize




While Edley prefers a radical reconstruction of the role of the
courts, if that is not possible, he will support the more modest reform of
"harder look" review (pp. 169-70). Such review would "take explicit
account of the necessary interplay of decision making paradigms" (p.
170). One of its functions would be to encourage greater transparency in
agency processes by promoting "forthright articulation of the true bases
for agency choice, so as to deter misexecution and permit frank appraisal,
by the public, of the quality and character of political processes and ide-
ologies" (p. 206). Rather than having to characterize politically moti-
vated decisions as based on expert judgment, agencies could admit to
political influences and be reviewed on how effectively they took account
of the range of affected interests (pp. 190-92). To Edley, "politics should
be permitted... as the rational basis for choice among otherwise reason-
able alternative constructions of the evidence or as the rational basis for a
resource allocation decision concerning the desirability of further
research" (p. 194).
In developing this idea, Edley is caught up by his own use of overin-
clusive categories. His linking of policy convictions with interest accom-
modation under the common rubric of politics forces him to separate
politics-as-preferences from politics-as-market (pp. 184-85) in discussing
judicial review. Both these labels seem to me unfortunate. The former
equates a top official's attachment to a policy position derived from
whimsy or an accident of upbringing with a position arising from the
thoughtful application of some broad principle of social justice. Both are
"preferences" to Edley. The latter creates the impression that interest
group balancing is somehow like a market, "with the currency being
electoral reward" (p. 185). Yet social choice theory teaches that this is
untrue.7 The structures of political and market institutions are vastly
6. Further, the separation of powers applies not just to the three branches of the federal
government, but also to the relationship between the federal government and the states. Traditional
administrative law courses have spent little time on this relationship, but it too is crucial for a full
evaluation of institutional competence.
7. For an accessible review of the field, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989).
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different, and there is nothing equivalent to the two fundamental theo-
rems of welfare economics in political life.8 That is, the political bargain-
ing process need not produce efficient results and may weight individual
interests in very different ways than the "market."
Conceding the distinction, Edley's use of the concepts of politics-as-
preferences and politics-as-market is unconvincing. Why is the former
"weak" and the latter "strong" (p. 185)? Why should courts be more
willing to defer to the whimsy of an administrator than to a bargain ham-
mered out by affected interests (pp. 185-86)? Edley's idea that interest
group politics is essentially like a top administrator's individualized
weighting of costs and benefits9 is problematic. True, an agency execu-
tive may sometimes make a decision by trying to imagine the bargain
that would have been made by the relevant groups, but Edley means to
include more than this in the politics-as-preferences concept. Also
included is the administrator who argues from first principles to a result
(p. 184). Similarly, politics-as-market, or as I would prefer to call it,
politics-as-bargain, does not necessarily involve a tradeoff among all
those affected. After all, the essence of democratic choice is the use of
voting rules that require less than unanimous consent. In the legislature,
political choice need not improve everyone's lot. Why should it need to
do so in the executive branch? Once one contrasts deductive arguments
from first principles with a political process based on voting, the differ-
ence becomes one of kind, not, as Edley asserts, of degree (p. 186).
I do, however, agree with Edley that courts should not necessarily
be more deferential in the case of politics-as-preferences than in the case
of politics-as-market (p. 186). I differ with him mainly in seeing the pos-
sibility of significant differences in the appropriate standard of review,
depending upon whether the administrator claims to have reached a rea-
soned decision in the face of competing principles or whether the agency
claims to have reached a political accommodation.
Edley concludes his discussion of modest reforms with a list of
unexceptional proposals for agency policymaking in the light of scientific
uncertainty and conflicts of interests and values (pp. 209-12). He favors
greater disclosure of the methodology used to make choices, arguing
both for "the rationalizing force of reasoned elaboration" and "the con-
straining force of public scrutiny" (p. 210). He also argues for a weak
rational choice standard, urging "a rule of presumptive desirability of
8. The two fundamental theorems of welfare economics demonstrate that a competitive
equilibrium is Pareto optimal (efficient) and that every Pareto efficient point can be supported by a
competitive equilibrium. For a discussion, see A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL
CHOICE THEORY 39-63 (1980).
9. "If raw ideological preferences are permissible, then so is an electoral marketplace, in
principle. There remains only the question of degree" (p. 186) (emphasis in original).
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quasi-adversarial processes" that would "place a burden of persuasion on
an agency unwilling to design ad hoe procedures of some sort to expose
and resolve important disputes amenable to expert debate" (p. 211).
III
SOUND GOVERNANCE
Having made obeisance in the direction of incrementalism, Edley is
now ready for a more unconstrained exploration of alternatives. He is,
however, still stuck with his triangles, only now the three factors are not
pulling against one another but, in his ideal world, are playing together
as a trio (p. 222-23). He seems not to have considered the possibility that
the administrative state might better be described as a quartet or even a
quintet, and he mixes up concepts as different in kind as bowing tech-
niques, repertoire selection, and violin production.
In pushing his thesis to its logical limits, Edley's speculation focuses
on the norm of "sound governance" (p. 213). But what does he mean by
this? Is this concept anything more than the avuncular intoning of pious
hopes? I think it is something more than that, but Edley's exercise in
norm construction is fundamentally incomplete.
Edley's notion of sound governance takes the following form. First,
the three decisionmaking paradigms should be integrated and ably exe-
cuted (p. 213). Second, judicial review should assure this result (p. 213).
The courts would have a quasi-hierarchical position vis-A-vis agencies,
but both the agencies and the legislature would be able to correct "judi-
cial errors" (pp. 214-15). Edley uses the image of partnership, but recog-
nizes its limitations (pp. 214-15). Third, "the specific content of sound
governance must be defined in an evolutionary process that involves all
branches of government and the public" (p. 213). Unfortunately, this
evolutionary idea, with its Darwinian overtones, is articulated so vaguely
as to undermine the rest of the formulation.
Edley begins by pointing out that administrative law's obsession
with agency discretion is anachronistic and irrelevant to the project of
promoting sound governance (pp. 215-17)."° Bureaucrats are not merely
technical implementers but are "full partner[s] in the lawmaking and pol-
icy-making activity of government" (p. 218) (citation omitted).
With this characterization of agency officials in mind, Edley seeks to
have administrative law play a more active role in promoting policy inno-
vation, to assure sound governmental decisionmaking (p. 221). He
points to scholarship that advocates quasi-market incentives in pollution,
that evaluates regional authorities for water pollution control, and that
10. In support of this claim, Edley observes that schools of public policy rarely even consider
the concern with discretion that animates administrative law (p. 217 n.4).
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seeks to incorporate "noncommodity values" as examples of implicit rec-
ognition of the importance of the content of public policy (p. 221). He
views it as a hopeful sign that some legally trained analysts have pro-
posed such substantive policy innovations (p. 222 n.16).
In his view, the courts will not be able to foster innovation, however,
unless they refrain both from pigeonholing problems and from
pigeonholing themselves (p. 223). By no means are they to become mere
technocrats, although Edley does propose that judges receive better
training in the techniques of policy analysis and the scientific method
(p. 239). The goal is for courts to require agencies to balance politics,
expertise, and adjudicatory fairness and for courts to "evaluate the qual-
ity of agency activities in each of these three respects" (p. 225). Agen-
cies, in turn, must "frankly acknowledge the role of political, ideological,
or subjective analyses" and be open and explicit about the factors (scien-
tific, political, and law-based) that influenced their decisions (pp. 190-91).
Even though Edley does his best to be noncommittal in articulating
norms of sound governance, he does not entirely succeed. In fact, he
seems quite set on having courts require rationality, even asking rhetori-
cally if agencies can be said to have a "prerogative to act with doubtful
rationality" (p. 231). While he supposes that an evolutionary process
will develop norms over time, he proposes that, as a start, existing norms
be used. To illustrate his point, he presents an example of a judicial chal-
lenge to a regulation governing use of a hazardous chemical in the work-
place where the evidence is uncertain and there are powerful groups on
each side. His heavily hedged proposal for judicial action is as follows:
I would not object to a court requiring the agency to evaluate regu-
latory alternatives using cost-benefit analysis or the Ames test for bacte-
rial mutagenicity or to do so in terms of impact on each of several classes
of affected individuals or firms. These matters seem substantive and cer-
tainly inappropriate for courts steeped in separation of powers ethos. But
if a judge is persuaded that action without such analysis might well be
unsound, the court should require it: When an accessible norm of sound
decision making exists, or when the court can attempt to formulate one
without prejudice to the power of agency or legislature to correct a judi-
cial misconception, a conscientious judge should act on personal convic-
tion (p. 231).
To make his trio play harmoniously, however, Edley recognizes that
current judicial personnel and institutions must be reformed in order to
assume their new roles with competence. Judges would need some
retraining11 and courts should "devise the requisite systems of intellec-
tual and logistical support, including perhaps staff experts, broader
11. "Continuing legal education for judges, including special programs in economics, are but
one example" (p. 239).
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libraries, resort to expert amici, consultants, and so forth" (pp. 238-39).
He further proposes that consideration be given to establishing special-
ized courts where judges do not have life tenure (pp. 247-50), and views
structural injunctions with favor (p. 257).
All these specifics are canvassed quite quickly, yet they are in many
ways the most interesting part of the book. The reader wants to know
more. For example, even a passing acquaintance with dynamic models
in the social and behavioral sciences ought to suggest that it is insufficient
to point hopefully to "evolution." Some systems evolve into a steady-
state trap; others unravel and collapse. Only under a limited set of con-
ditions do dynamic systems move ever onward and upward. Edley has
two tasks remaining now that he has demonstrated the aridity of current
doctrine. First, he needs to specify what "up" is, in an evolutionary
sense. Second, he must demonstrate that the institutional reforms he
proposes will, over time, lead to desirable evolutionary trends. At times
Edley seems to believe that the mere existence of gradual change is suffi-
cient justification. But evils as well as goods can develop slowly, and if
we cannot tell one from the other, how are we to know whether to rejoice
or despair?
IV
FROM CRITIQUE TO CONSTRUCTION
My critique of Edley's work centers on his conflation of disparate
categories and his failure to provide a convincing normative framework
for analysis. As Edley himself has demonstrated, criticism is easier than
construction, but I will nevertheless conclude by suggesting how an exer-
cise in normative analysis might begin.
I have already indicated my discomfort with Edley's merging policy
and politics. Here, I want to develop a further distinction between sub-
stantive policymaking and the implementation of policy in particular
cases. These categories are not disjoint, since an agency can implement a
statute through case-by-case adjudications which produce a pattern of
precedents with policy content. Nevertheless, the distinction is central to
my enterprise because I argue that different paradigms should govern.
For policymaking, agencies should seek to accomplish the goals of
the statute at the least social cost, using procedures that permit interested
citizens to evaluate agency action. Technocratic expertise should be bal-
anced against the requirements of democratic accountability. When
goals have been well specified in the statute, the agency should engage in
cost-effectiveness analysis. Such an analysis considers not only budget-
ary costs, but also the costs imposed on private individuals and firms by
public actions. The aim is to accomplish the public goal with the least
use of society's resources.
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When, as is usually the case, goals are not precisely specified in the
statute and budgetary appropriations are limited, the agency should seek
to balance benefits and costs to maximize net social benefits. The impre-
cision of the statute should give the agency leeway to evaluate both bene-
fits and costs. When goals are stated broadly, funding limitations should
force the agency to seek the most beneficial use of its scarce resources.
Of course, cost-benefit analyses cannot always be carried out with preci-
sion. Analysts must recognize the importance of including unquantifi-
able harms and benefits and should sometimes avoid formal analysis
because the key factors are too vaguely specified.
The pursuit of net benefit maximization does not necessarily mean
that agencies should do cost-benefit analyses. In one case, a process like
informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act-which
combines consultation with balancing by top officials-may make sense.
In another, a negotiated bargain between the affected interests may be
more likely to produce a result that maximizes net benefits. In still
another case, the agency might create incentives for private individuals
and firms to act, without specifying a particular desired result. When
private individuals and firms possess much of the information needed to
develop sound policies, it may be best to give them incentives to reveal
this information instead of centralizing analysis and decisionmaking in
the agency.
Requiring agencies to maximize net benefits within statutory con-
straints does not imply a lack of concern for distributive justice. Rather,
it reflects a principle of institutional competence. Individual regulatory
statutes only affect a portion of the population. A policy that concen-
trates on distributing fairly the benefits and burdens of one statute may
well be unfair to those who are excluded from the regulator's ken. If all
agencies concentrated on fairness to the exclusion of efficiency, the result
could make most people worse off and would surely be a crazy quilt of
special purpose benefits that would be difficult to justify. People would
be treated differently who differ only in whether or not they happen to
come under the jurisdiction of a particular statute. To echo a familiar
theme in public finance, redistribution policy should be accomplished
through a general system of taxes and transfers, not piecemeal through
the regulatory system. The basic function of the regulatory system in
promoting distributive justice could be the provision of information
about who has been hurt and harmed by its programs. This information,
together with material on the basic policy choices of the agency, would
form the basis for any legislative actions to change the agency's mandate
or to develop counteracting compensation schemes.
Turning to implementation, however, I believe that the priorities
should be quite different: here both substantive and procedural fairness
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should dominate. Once the agency has set overall policy to maximize net
social benefits under its enabling statutes, implementation should avoid
favoritism and arbitrariness. Of course, everyone cannot be treated abso-
lutely equally, but the agency should be able to articulate its principles of
enforcement and should establish procedures permitting individuals to
challenge implementation decisions. Administrative law's traditional
concern with protecting individuals from state tyranny would become
salient at this juncture. Constraints of time and money can appropriately
limit agency behavior, but budget constraints operate here to limit the
fairness of procedures, not-as in the policymaking area-to limit the
achievement of efficiency goals. Implementation and policymaking are
linked, however, since the more resources the agency invests in its imple-
mentation plan, the fewer it will have for policymaking. One implication
of my emphasis on the distinction between substantive policy and fair
implementation is a presumption in favor of agency rulemaking. The use
of a series of adjudications to make policy runs the risk of confusing
fairness to individuals with furtherance of broad policy goals.
In my formulation, then, substantive norms-not procedure-are
central to policymaking. Only those procedural requirements that fur-
ther openness have independent importance. The goal of such proce-
dures is not fairness or an improvement in the quality of policy, but an
increase in the government's accountability to voters. For implementa-
tion, in contrast, procedural fairness is a central goal which may be in
tension with the achievement of policy goals.
The judiciary should evaluate policy, as they do today, for accord
with statutory purpose. They should, however, as Edley himself recom-
mends, consider substance even when agency discretion is allowed, by
requiring the agency to make a plausible case that it has maximized net
benefits subject to statutory, budgetary, and informational constraints.
The courts would not examine procedures except to determine whether
the process is sufficiently open to permit political accountability. In
reviewing implementation actions, however, the procedural inquiry
would be central in individual cases, and the courts would also hear
claims that an agency's overall implementation practice was arbitrary
and unfair.
My outline of the distinction between policymaking and implemen-
tation is in the spirit of Edley's effort. He too supports increases in policy
analysis and greater openness in the executive branch. He also favors a
judiciary more willing to examine substance while it at the same time
remains unwilling to make policy itself. Although this sketch has raised
more questions than it has answered, I hope that, along with Edley's own
effort, it will begin a dialogue among administrative lawyers, policy ana-
lysts, and politically active men and women concerning the concept of
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"sound governance"-a dialogue that perhaps can produce concrete sug-
gestions for administrative law reform.
